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Not for the Sake of Punishment Alone:  
Comments on Viewing the Criminal Sanction 
Through Latter-day Saint Thought 
Marguerite A. Driessen∗
. . . God himself atoneth for the sins of the world, to bring about 
the plan of mercy, to appease the demands of justice, that God 
might be a perfect, just God, and a merciful God also.1
In his article, Viewing the Criminal Sanction Through Latter-day 
Saint Thought, Professor Martin Gardner undertakes to examine 
whether the doctrines and teachings of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints (hereinafter the “Church”) provide any insights on 
the use of the criminal sanction in secular society.2 Given, as 
Professor Gardner states, that “the criminal sanction entails the 
purposeful infliction of suffering upon offenders,”3 a periodic review 
of our society’s use of that sanction is a necessary and important 
undertaking. Professor Gardner’s choice to conduct that review 
through the lens of a particular religious dogma is both interesting 
and unique. I was asked to comment on Professor Gardner’s article 
presented at the LDS Perspectives on Law Conference.4 This 
Comment will first provide a brief overview of the structure and 
content of Professor Gardner’s article. Second, it will examine 
∗ Associate Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School at Brigham Young 
University. B.A., 1985, Brigham Young University; J.D., 1989, Stanford Law School. The 
views expressed in this Comment do not necessarily reflect the views of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints, the J. Reuben Clark Law School, or the Brigham Young University 
Law Review. 
 1. Alma 42:15 (Book of Mormon). 
 2. See Martin R. Gardner, Viewing the Criminal Sanction Through Latter-day Saint 
Thought, 2003 B.Y.U. L. REV. 861; see also infra notes 30–32 and accompanying text. 
 3. Gardner, supra note 2, at 861. 
 4. The primary sources for my comments on Professor Gardner’s work are the LDS 
scriptures and various commentaries on them. Scriptural analysis and doctrinal interpretation 
are areas in which theologians spend their entire careers developing the necessary expertise to 
speak authoritatively. I make no claims to having done so. Instead, I have evaluated Professor 
Gardner’s article in light of my criminal justice training and experience and my own gospel 
study. 
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Professor Gardner’s analysis of Latter-day Saint (LDS) philosophies 
and his application thereof as support for his ultimate conclusion, 
which is that LDS teachings require punishment for violations of 
secular laws “in order that justice be done.”5 This section 
demonstrates that Professor Gardner has provided a thorough and 
engaging discussion of retributivism and has outlined apparent 
supports for retributivist justification of criminal punishment in LDS 
philosophy. However, because of his failure to consider the 
atonement of Jesus Christ in his analysis, Professor Gardner has 
misapprehended the LDS scriptures and teachings he used to 
support his conclusions. 
The final section of this Comment posits that the conspicuous 
absence of any discussion of the atonement of Jesus Christ and the 
concomitant effects thereof on his scriptural analysis leave Professor 
Gardner’s arguments ultimately unconvincing. Finally, it will use 
LDS philosophies, with primary reliance on the doctrine of the 
atonement, to explain why the support for Professor Gardner’s pure 
retributivist theory of punishment just is not there. 
I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF VIEWING THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 
THROUGH LDS THOUGHT 
The substance of Professor Gardner’s analysis is presented in two 
sections: Section II, describing “just deserts” retributivism, and 
Section III, discussing secular punishment and LDS thought.6 Both 
of these sections will be addressed in turn. 
 5. Gardner, supra note 2, at 861. 
 6. Id. at 862, 871. Professor Gardner’s other sections include an introduction as 
Section I and a conclusion as Section V. Id. at 861, 889. Professor Gardner also includes 
Section IV, a discussion of the death penalty in light of LDS thought and his conclusions that 
this particular punishment is not required under that dogma. Id. at 882–89. I found the 
inclusion of this section unnecessary and somewhat distracting. This lengthy discussion, 
comprising nearly one-third of his article, adds nothing to Professor Gardner’s thesis that LDS 
philosophy supports a just deserts retributivist justification for punishment. In fact, this 
discussion weakens Professor Gardner’s arguments by asserting several key propositions that 
contradict his thesis. 
Professor Gardner’s flawed propositions include admitting that retributivists require 
punishment for wrongdoing but do not require any particular form of punishment to meet the 
demands of justice. Id. at 883. He also admits that the just application of the death penalty 
would require a degree of accuracy in measuring culpability that is simply not possible in our 
secular courts. Id. at 884. Finally, Professor Gardner states that the finality and irrevocability of 
the death penalty make it an inappropriate sanction for people who have been cautioned 
against making judgments of other people. Id. at 887. Despite Professor Gardner’s statement 
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A. The Recipe for “Just Deserts” 
In Section II of his article, Professor Gardner provides an 
explanation of and the underlying rationale behind “just deserts” 
retributivism. This theory of retributivism, he writes, “considers 
punishing offenders as intrinsically good, independent of any 
beneficial consequences.”7 Under this view, those who violate the 
law must be punished for that reason, and for that reason alone. For 
those who embrace this philosophy, it would be improper to impose 
punishment for any other reason—particularly utilitarian reasons 
involving the good of civil society or even some other benefit for the 
criminal himself.8 In fact, Professor Gardner states that “some desert 
theorists might advocate punishing offenders even if the results of 
such were socially detrimental.”9
In this section of his article, Professor Gardner does a thorough 
job presenting authority for just deserts retributivism. Beginning 
with the writings of Immanuel Kant,10 working through those of 
Herbert Morris11 and C.S. Lewis,12 and concluding finally with the 
to the contrary, id. at 888, as will be discussed infra, each of these points is equally applicable 
to other forms of secular punishment. 
 7. Id. at 862. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See id. at 863 (citing IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF 
JUSTICE 100 (John Lodd trans., 1965)). Gardner describes Kant as a classic retributivist and 
quotes Kant as stating that “punishment can never be used merely as a means to promote some 
other good for the criminal himself or for civil society, but instead it must in all cases be 
imposed on him only on the ground that he has committed a crime.” Id. at 863 (emphasis 
added) (quoting KANT, supra, at 100). 
 11. See id. at 864 (citing Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, in PUNISHMENT 74 
(J. Feinberg & H. Gross eds., 1975)). Gardner cites Morris to argue that all people have a 
“moral right to be punished for their criminal offenses,” which Morris argues stems from each 
individual’s “right to be treated as a person.” Id. 
 12. See id. at 865 (citing C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, in 6 RES 
JUDICATAE 224 (1953)). Gardner presents Lewis’s critique of therapeutic models of 
punishment as further support for just deserts retributivism. Id. Lewis acknowledges that 
giving offenders their just deserts may have ancillary utilitarian effects and he sees no problem 
with that. Id. at 866 n.15 (quoting Lewis, supra, at 225). However, to impose punishment for 
any reason other than the “desert” would be wickedness. Id. Of import, Gardner cites Lewis to 
make the point that the therapeutic model of punishment, which Lewis labels the 
Humanitarian theory, misapprehends the concepts of mercy and justice by substituting mercy 
for justice and thereafter leads to a system of forced therapy, regardless of desire, that is 
inherently unmerciful. Id. at 867. 
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thoughts of Herbert L. Packer13 and Michael S. Moore,14 Professor 
Gardner establishes several salient aspects of the theory of just deserts 
retributivism that he later seeks to support through LDS philosophy. 
First, and most important, is the notion that every individual is a 
person with the right to choose evil over good.15 As will be discussed, 
infra, this first point is wholly consistent with mainstream LDS 
philosophy. 
Second, Professor Gardner presents the theory that stemming 
from personhood and the right to choose evil is the right to be 
punished commensurate with the evil that you do. That is to say, 
society must punish the individual who commits crime, for failure to 
do so is to deny that individual’s autonomy. After all, that person 
made a deliberate choice to violate societal norms and to bring forth 
the natural consequences of that choice. Therefore, the criminal has 
a right to those consequences.16
The final aspect of just deserts stems ultimately from Professor 
Gardner’s second point: since the criminal has the right to be 
punished, society cannot properly dilute, mitigate, or forgo due 
punishment consistent with that right and with the demands of 
justice.17 Thus, humanitarian goals aimed at rehabilitation, treatment, 
or any other therapeutic models of crime and punishment are, at 
best, misguided, and must not exist in a just society.18
Professor Gardner has painstakingly presented these points and 
has gleaned from them a clear, concise theory of just deserts 
retributivism. It is this theory of retributivism that Professor Gardner 
asserts is not just supported in LDS philosophy, but demanded by 
 13. See id. at 868 (citing HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL 
SANCTION 53–88 (1968)). Gardner cites Packer’s example of a “good behavior pill” (that 
removes all criminal propensities) that the government chooses to use instead of punishment to 
illustrate Packer’s support for “the right to be bad” that is inherent in human autonomy. Id. at 
868 (citing PACKER, supra, at 57–88). 
 14. See id. at 869 (citing Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in 
FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 80, 81 (Leo Katz et al. eds., 1999)). Gardner cites Moore 
to illustrate a different support for just deserts retributivism: the virtuous feelings of guilt and 
desire to be punished each of us would have were we to commit the crime in question. Id. 
(citing Moore, supra, at 81). Moore argues that we should trust those feelings and translate 
the punishments we would imagine ourselves deserving in similar circumstances into the actual 
punishment imposed on the real offender. Id. (citing Moore, supra, at 82). 
 15. Id. at 865–68. 
 16. Id. at 864–67. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 867–70. 
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it.19 However, it is not at all clear that the theory of just deserts 
retributivism is demanded by LDS doctrine.20 To the contrary, it 
appears that LDS doctrine weighs in opposition to just deserts 
retributivism. 
B. LDS Thought on Secular Punishment 
As illustrated above, in Section II of his article, Professor 
Gardner described the theory of just deserts retributivism and 
provided support for the rationale underlying it.21 In his next section, 
“Secular Punishment and LDS Thought,” Professor Gardner 
discusses elements of LDS doctrine that he argues support the 
retributivist theory of punishment he previously described.22 In this 
section, Professor Gardner gleans support from three sources: 
scriptural references, statements of Church leaders, and an analysis of 
the LDS beliefs regarding free agency and the premortal life.23 While 
the particulars of Professor Gardner’s analysis will be discussed in my 
Section II, infra, there are a few general observations regarding his 
analysis of scriptural references that are worthy of mention. 
First, Professor Gardner admits to the paucity of direct scriptural 
references to the use of the secular criminal law.24 Indeed, his entire 
scriptural support is limited primarily to a discussion of only two 
sections of the Doctrine & Covenants.25 Professor Gardner freely 
admits that even these scriptures can be interpreted to support a 
 19. See id. at 861, 889. Professor Gardner states that “Church doctrine provides a 
unique foundation for the view that punishment is required in order that justice be done,” id. 
at 861 (emphasis added), and then concludes that his presentation of the LDS perspective on 
the criminal law “commits Latter-day Saints to strive for and uphold systems of criminal law 
that do justice,” id. at 889 (emphasis added). As mentioned previously, Professor Gardner 
does not address other purposes of punishment. That punishment for crime may be justified by 
rehabilitative, deterrent, or other utilitarian purposes is not refuted in his article. In fact, an 
early footnote acknowledges his belief that Latter-day Saints can, presumably consistent with 
LDS doctrine, defend utilitarian purposes of punishment. See id. at 861 n.4. It was not 
Professor Gardner’s intent to refute any other purpose of punishment. Rather, his goal was to 
demonstrate that LDS philosophies specifically support a retributivist view of punishment. 
 20. This Comment will not critique retributivism generally, but rather will point out 
areas in which LDS philosophy is inconsistent with it. 
 21. Gardner, supra note 2, at 862–70. 
 22. Id. at 871–81. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 871. 
 25. Id. at 871–74. 
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utilitarian rationale rather than a retributivist one.26 As further 
evidence of the dearth of direct scriptural references, this section is 
extremely brief, comprising only three pages in a twenty-eight page 
article. Finally, Professor Gardner’s approach to this analysis is quite 
diffident because his interpretations of the scriptural passages are 
stated not as conclusions, but as possibilities—making each step in 
his analysis a tentative conditional rather than a finding.27
Given the nature of the topic and the realities regarding resource 
material to address it, these observations would ordinarily not be a 
concern. In this instance, however, these observations align to point 
out Professor Gardner’s analytical weakness: despite the admitted 
limitations to his supporting references and the conclusions that may 
be drawn therefrom, Professor Gardner confidently asserts that “[o]n 
this view, it is essential that violators of the law be punished in order 
to receive their just deserts.”28
Professor Gardner’s remaining supports discussed in his Section 
II do not suffer from these express limitations. However, for reasons 
that will be discussed in my Section II, infra, his analysis in these 
subjections also falls short of providing the support for retributivism 
that Professor Gardner ultimately asserts.29
II. AN ANALYSIS OF PROFESSOR GARDNER’S LDS SUPPORT FOR 
RETRIBUTIVISM 
A. The Misapprehension of LDS References 
Given the foregoing discussion, Professor Gardner’s preface to 
his discussion of LDS thought on secular punishment in which he 
acknowledges the paucity of direct scriptural references to it is 
particularly apt. I adopt his disclaimer as I initiate my own analysis. 
The lack of direct scriptural references obviously makes authoritative 
analysis difficult. Add to this difficulty the fact that it is scripture that 
 26. Id. at 871, 873. 
 27. See id. at 871–74. Note the number of times Professor Gardner states, in essence, “if 
the scripture means this, then it supports a retributivist view.” 
 28. Id. at 874. 
 29. See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text which illustrate that these sections 
ultimately lead to the conclusion that the doctrine of free agency is central to LDS doctrine 
and that with choice comes accountability; however, these sections do not lead to the 
conclusion that “accountability” must be meted in a particular secular manner. 
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must be analyzed, and the difficulty increases exponentially. Fully 
acknowledging that sufficient holes and ambiguities exist in the texts 
on these matters and that minds brilliant as well as reasonable could 
differ, this section nevertheless resolves that, for the reasons that 
follow, Professor Gardner’s interpretation of scripture and the 
thoughts of Church leaders was simply wrong. 
First, it appears that Professor Gardner identified the few existing 
scriptural references to secular law and punishment and used them to 
support a theory of punishment that he had already formed.30 It 
would not be fair to say that he quoted the supporting passages out 
of context and thereby misrepresented their meaning; however, it 
would be fair to say that Professor Gardner missed the global or 
overarching context in which all of these scriptures have been 
presented and therefore misapprehended their meanings. For 
example, Professor Gardner cites to verse 8 of section 134 of the 
Doctrine & Covenants as authority for the position that LDS 
doctrine supports retributivist principles.31 My reading of this passage 
leads me to conclude that not only does it fail to support a 
retributivist theory of punishment, but it also provides direct support 
for utilitarian justifications. Verse 8 reads in part:  
We believe that the commission of crime should be punished 
according to the nature of the offense; that murder, treason, 
robbery, theft, and the breach of the of the general peace, in all 
respects, should be punished according to their criminality and 
their tendency to evil among men, by the laws of that government in 
which the offense is committed . . . .32  
As clarified by the second clause, rather than arguing in favor of 
retributivism, the first clause is a profession of a general belief that 
punishments should be proportionate to the crimes for which they 
are imposed. As I read it, the second clause is an attempt to clarify 
that general belief with a specific example. This is illustrated by the 
inclusion of the phrase “according to their criminality and their 
 30. It is clear—not just from Viewing the Criminal Sanction Through Latter-day Saint 
Thought, but also from his other works—that Professor Gardner himself leans toward pure just 
deserts retributivism. See Martin R. Gardner, The Right of Juvenile Offenders to be Punished: 
Some Implications of Treating Kids as Persons, 68 NEB. L. REV. 182 (1989); Martin R. 
Gardner, The Right to be Punished: A Suggested Constitutional Theory, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 838 
(1981). 
 31. Gardner, supra note 2, at 871. 
 32. Doctrine & Covenants 134:8 (emphasis added). 
DRI-FIN 9/29/2003 10:29 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2003 
948 
 
tendency to evil among men.” This phrase includes a limitation on 
the degree of punishment and expresses a belief that unpunished 
offenses lead others to lawlessness. Inherent in this language is a 
desire to deter men from that tendency to evil—a utilitarian rationale 
for punishment. The interpretation that Doctrine & Covenants 134:8 
supports utilitarian purposes of punishment rather than retributivist 
purposes is further supported by the third and final clause in this 
verse which states, “and for the public peace and tranquility all men 
should step forward and use their ability in bringing offenders 
against good laws to punishment.”33 Professor Gardner acknowledges 
that this clause is problematic for just deserts retributivism because it 
“suggests utilitarian purposes of punishment” in providing a reason 
for punishing offenders (furthering the causes of public peace and 
tranquility) that is not punishment for its own sake.34 However, he 
misses the true import of the adjective “good” modifying the “laws” 
for which punishment is to be sought. We may certainly infer from 
this clause that there is no obligation to bring offenders against bad 
laws to punishment. Retributivists would argue that the violation of 
the law requires punishment simply because the law was broken. As 
long as the law exists, violations thereof will require punishment—
even if some consider the law to be unwise or unjust. 
The conclusion that verse 8 does not support a retributivist 
theory of punishment becomes more clear when it is read in 
connection with verses 9 and 10, which Professor Gardner failed to 
quote. Verse 8 does not describe how the Lord wants the members 
of his Church to view all laws, it simply describes those laws the Lord 
views as just. Verse 9 describes a category of laws the Church viewed 
as unjust: laws mingling church and state that furthered the cause of 
any particular religion over the interests of another.35 Verse 10 
describes religious freedoms that the Church held paramount (the 
freedom to deal with their own members without legal intrusion 
regarding issues of fellowship and membership in good standing) 
and described more laws that it would view as unjust (laws 
permitting religious societies to place a member’s life, liberty, or 
 33. Id. (emphasis added). 
 34. Gardner, supra note 2, at 871. 
 35. Doctrine & Covenants 134:9 (“We do not believe it just to mingle religious 
influence with civil government, whereby one religious society is fostered and another 
proscribed in its spiritual privileges, and the individual rights of its members, as citizens, 
denied.”). 
DRI-FIN 9/29/2003 10:29 PM 
941] Not for the Sake of Punishment Alone 
 949 
 
property in jeopardy, or permitting them to inflict physical 
punishments, or any punishments at all beyond excommunication).36 
Professor Gardner missed the significance of this larger context 
because he limited his analysis to exclusively verse 8. 
Professor Gardner also missed the broader context in his only 
other scriptural reference, Doctrine & Covenants 42:84–86. These 
verses describe certain offenses for which Latter-day Saints must 
“deliver up” fellow members who commit crime to the secular law to 
be punished.37 If you read nothing else, these passages appear to 
support his conclusion that LDS philosophy supports just deserts 
retributivism. However, when read with the whole of section 42, the 
import of those three specific verses shifts. 
Section 42 contains instructions to members of the Church for 
dealing with each other, dealing with transgressors, and as a part of 
that, dealing with lawbreakers.38 Specific transgressions are to be 
dealt with in specified manners, with a couple of general 
statements—those quoted by Professor Gardner—that those who 
violate the secular laws should be left to those laws for punishment. 
In isolation, those verses could be read as a demand that secular 
justice be meted out. However, in context, those verses instead 
appear to be counsel to the leaders of the Church to let the secular 
law deal with secular criminals. When read with the rest of the 
section, it seems that verse 8 is more of a jurisdictional limitation 
than a moral imperative.39
 36. Verse 10 states, 
We believe that all religious societies have a right to deal with their members for 
disorderly conduct, according to the rules and regulations of such societies; 
provided that such dealings be for fellowship and good standing; but we do not 
believe that any religious society has authority to try men on the right of property or 
life, to take from them this world’s goods, or to put them in jeopardy of either life 
or limb, or to inflict any physical punishment upon them. They can only 
excommunicate them from their society, and withdraw from them their fellowship. 
Id. at 134:10. 
 37. Id. at 42:84–86. 
 38. See generally id. at 42:69–93 (the section heading states that the Prophet Joseph 
Smith described this section as “embracing the law of the church”). 
 39. Although the language appears to state a command to “deliver” lawbreakers to the 
secular authorities, the notion that this is a jurisdictional limitation is supported by Church 
practice. Those who confess transgressions to ecclesiastical leaders do not report them. 
Consider the case of Paul Turner who confessed to trying to kill his wife in 2001. News 
accounts reported that his bishop encouraged him to turn himself in. LDS bishops to whom 
the confessions are made honor the sanctity of the confessional and do not turn those who 
confess over to the authorities. See Geoffrey Fattah, Guilty Plea in Poisoning, DESERET NEWS, 
DRI-FIN 9/29/2003 10:29 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2003 
950 
 
Professor Gardner’s discussion of comments made by leaders of 
the Church is more robust, but ultimately suffers from the same 
problem affecting his scriptural analysis: misinterpretation due to 
missed context. When Professor Gardner quotes Dallin H. Oaks, he 
accurately recounts the words, but misses the context in which they 
were presented and again misapprehends their meaning. He quotes 
Elder Oaks and attributes to him an apparent retributivist position40 
based upon several passages of text in which Elder Oaks is actually 
illustrating the distinction between man’s criminal law and the 
Lord’s law of discipline for the members of the Church.41 However, 
Elder Oaks is simply stating his opinion on the nature of the secular 
law. He does not in those passages—nor in any other identifiable 
source—adopt that view as his own, voice approval for it, or in any 
way assert that LDS doctrine dictates that is the way it is supposed to 
be. 
Professor Gardner quotes Elder Oaks regarding people “feeling” 
that justice has been done when the punishment fits the crime.42 
Given Elder Oaks’ subsequent discussion of the parable of the 
mediator, it is clear that Professor Gardner makes too much of this 
statement. People may not “feel” that justice has been done unless 
the offender “receives what he deserves.” However, when the 
demands of justice have been met, these people must be satisfied. 
The creditor, having been paid by the intermediary, cannot demand 
that the debtor suffer for his failure to be responsible, to pay on 
time, or to pay from the debtor’s own pocket.43 The creditor’s or 
Mar. 28, 2003, at A1. While a party’s willingness to confess to appropriate people outside of 
the Church is relevant to whether that party’s repentance is sincere, its relevance is minimal in 
terms of what ecclesiastical discipline the Church subsequently metes out. 
 40. See Gardner, supra note 2, at 876 (quoting DALLIN H. OAKS, THE LORD’S WAY 
217 (1991), for the proposition that the admonition that “crime should be punished” is 
grounded in the interest of doing justice). 
 41. See OAKS, supra note 40, at 216–17. Elder Oaks states that the laws of men have no 
theory of mercy and take no account of the atonement. It is “justice” that requires 
punishment. It is this “justice” that Elder Oaks urges us to look beyond in seeking to follow 
the Lord’s way instead of man’s way. Id. 
 42. Gardner, supra note 2, at 876–77. Note that in the passage provided by Professor 
Gardner he has run together statements from two different paragraphs. The new paragraph 
begins: “People generally feel . . . .” See OAKS, supra note 40, at 216–17. 
 43. See OAKS, supra note 40, at 219; THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY 
SAINTS, GOSPEL PRINCIPLES MANUAL 75–77 (1997) [hereinafter GOSPEL PRINCIPLES] 
(containing Boyd K. Packer’s parable of the Mediator). 
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anyone else’s feelings that the delinquent debtor may have gotten 
significantly less than he deserved are simply irrelevant. 
In fact, despite the few various references to LDS scriptures, it 
does not appear that Church practice recognizes an obligation to 
turn over to secular authority those who transgress the secular law. 
Repentance, for example, requires confession to the Lord and, if the 
sins are serious, confession to appropriate priesthood authority.44 It 
also requires confession and the making of restitution to any person 
the transgressor may have harmed.45 It does not require confession to 
the sovereign whose laws the transgressors may have also violated. 
It is true that someone under a criminal justice sentence is not 
generally baptized until the sentence has been satisfied. It is also true 
that the commission of crime may result in a member of the Church 
being disfellowshipped or excommunicated. However, it is not 
required that a transgressor suffer a criminal penalty. Rather, he or 
she need only be willing to be subject to the secular authority. 
Otherwise, repentance would require not simply that you confess, for 
example, to stealing from a neighbor, but that the neighbor report 
you to the police. It would require not only that you turn yourself 
over to the police, but that they arrest you, and it would require that 
the prosecutor charge you. In the face of these charges you must not 
only plead guilty, but the judge must impose a penalty, and that 
penalty must be commensurate with what you did in order for your 
“restitution” to be complete. Yet it is not the case that a person’s 
repentance is dependant upon whether his victim seeks redress at the 
law and whether the secular authorities exact “retribution” under 
that law. 
However, that is exactly what would be required under a just 
deserts recidivist theory of punishment. If secular punishment had to 
be meted out for violations of secular law as a condition of 
repentance, church action would be contingent upon whether all the 
parties with discretion to affect the secular decision chose to follow 
through with the infliction of a criminal penalty. I will state here 
emphatically that such is not the case. The Church believes in being 
 44. See GOSPEL PRINCIPLES, supra note 43, at 124–25. This confession would be made 
to one’s bishop or branch president. 
 45. Id. 
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subject to the civil law,46 but espouses no particular requirements 
regarding what the content of that law must be. 
The final prong of Professor Gardner’s argument that LDS 
philosophy supports just deserts retributivism is contained in his 
discussion of the LDS doctrines of free agency and the war in heaven 
that resulted from Lucifer’s attempt to destroy that agency.47 The 
basic conclusion is that each of us, our spirits, or more particularly, 
our intelligences, are eternal, separate entities. Consequently, we are 
free to choose our own paths.48 Because of that freedom, we are each 
accountable for our actions and to each individual belongs the praise 
or blame that should attach to those actions.49
These points are clearly made and firmly supported through the 
LDS scriptural references and commentaries thereto that Professor 
Gardner presents. Where his argument loses cohesion is in his 
subsequent conclusion that these doctrines parallel Michael Moore’s 
retributivist notion that offenders should be punished by the secular 
law because our divine spirits feel guilty for our misdeeds. Professor 
Gardner inexplicably jumps from the existence of agency to the 
necessity of punishment. 
Ironically, this is the opposite of LDS views on eternal life and 
exaltation. The LDS view of the plan of salvation centers around 
natural consequences for our actions here on earth and around the 
notion that our misdeeds, rather than bring upon us particular 
punishments in the hereafter, cut us off from specified blessings.50 
Ultimately, even these consequences can be eliminated through the 
atoning sacrifice of Jesus Christ. 
III. RETRIBUTIVISM AND THE ATONEMENT IN LDS THOUGHT 
Professor Gardner’s failure to address the LDS doctrine of the 
atonement in his analysis is his argument’s greatest weakness. If not 
for the atonement and its centrality to LDS doctrine, there are 
several points of textual interpretation presented in Professor 
 46. See Articles of Faith 12 (Pearl of Great Price). 
 47. Gardner, supra note 2, at 877–81. 
 48. Id. at 879. 
 49. Id. The purpose of Professor Gardner’s discussion of the premortal existence and of 
the war in heaven is to illustrate the importance of our free agency. Id. at 879–80. 
 50. Doctrine & Covenants 130:20–21. (“There is a law, irrevocably decreed in heaven 
before the foundations of this world, upon which all blessings are predicated—And when we 
obtain any blessing from God, it is by obedience to that law upon which it is predicated.”). 
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Gardner’s analysis, and subsequently challenged in this Comment, 
upon which reasonable minds could arrive at different conclusions. 
However, an understanding of the doctrine of the atonement 
militates in favor of interpreting texts and resolving any ambiguities 
more consistently with this Comment than with Professor Gardner’s 
thesis. 
This section discusses how these same references can be read and 
interpreted in a broader context. I do not just mean that the 
additional words, paragraphs, or pages in which the specific scriptural 
texts were embedded can and should be read more broadly. Rather, 
I mean that these sources should be read in light of the overarching 
context in which all of those words were written: the Lord’s plan of 
salvation.51
LDS scriptures tell us the Lord’s purpose for mortality: “For 
behold, this is my work and my glory—to bring to pass the 
immortality and eternal life of man.”52 We have been put on this 
earth to be tested, and if we are up to the test we will be exalted and 
thereby achieve that immortality and eternal life: 
 25 And we will prove them herewith, to see if they will do all 
things whatsoever the Lord their God shall command them; 
 26 And they who keep their first estate shall be added upon; and 
they who keep not their first estate shall not have glory in the same 
kingdom with those who keep their first estate; and they who keep 
their second estate shall have glory added upon their heads for ever 
and ever.53
These passages help explain what task we are here to do, but they do 
not tell us how we can accomplish it. The answer to that is the 
cornerstone of the plan of salvation; and the absence of any adequate 
discussion of it in Professor Gardner’s essay is its primary flaw. This 
cornerstone is the atonement of Jesus Christ. 
 51. The phrase “plan of salvation” refers to all those doctrines in the LDS philosophy 
that collectively purport to describe where we come from, why we are here, where we go after 
death, and, when possible, how it is all brought about. See GOSPEL PRINCIPLES, supra note 43, 
at 301–05 (providing a brief summary of the plan of salvation as an introduction to the topic 
of exaltation—the goal of that plan). 
 52. Moses 1:39 (Pearl of Great Price). 
 53. Abraham 3:25–26 (Pearl of Great Price). 
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Because we all fall short of perfection, “by the law no flesh is 
justified . . . .”54 However, notwithstanding our errors and 
shortcomings, Christian faiths espouse the general belief that we may 
all find redemption through the atonement of Jesus Christ. At the 
risk of gross oversimplification, the doctrine of the atonement 
provides that Jesus Christ paid the price for our sins such that we 
may be spared having to do so.55 Christ suffered the penalty for our 
sins to satisfy the demands of divine justice. And, of paramount 
importance to our discussion here, those who partake of the 
atonement by repenting of their sins will not have to personally 
suffer the consequences for those sins because the Savior will have 
already done so.56 This basic doctrine is central to the beliefs of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.57
Professor Gardner provides great detail of the LDS belief of the 
premortal existence and the war in heaven that was fought over the 
free agency of humankind.58 He relies upon the doctrine of free 
agency and the resulting individual accountability to support a right 
to be punished under the law, and thus, as support for an LDS belief 
that justice requires that each individual offender must be punished 
under the law.59 Given his detailed discussion of agency, it is 
surprising that Professor Gardner fails to mention that free agency is 
not an end unto itself, but merely a means to an end in LDS 
philosophy. We are not here simply to make choices (and suffer the 
attendant consequences). We are here to see if, given the freedom to 
choose, we will make the right choices.60
It is this freedom to choose coupled with the inevitability of our 
making wrong choices that make it necessary for us to have a Savior 
and an atonement. And this atonement, the cornerstone of the LDS 
 54. 2 Nephi 2:5 (Book of Mormon). 
 55. See GOSPEL PRINCIPLES, supra note 43, at 71–74; see also OAKS, supra note 40, at 
217–19. Of course, I make no pretense of providing a thorough explication of the LDS 
doctrine of the atonement. It is my hope only to describe it clearly and accurately enough for 
discussion in this context. 
 56. See GOSPEL PRINCIPLES, supra note 43, at 71–74. 
 57. The atonement is the means by which we have come to resolve the justice-mercy 
paradox. The apparent paradox derives from the fact that both justice and mercy are eternal 
principles, and neither can be satisfied at the expense of the other. See Alma 42:13–26 (Book 
of Mormon). 
 58. See Gardner, supra note 2, at 877–81. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See Abraham 3:25 (Pearl of Great Price). 
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view of the plan of salvation, is the antithesis of Professor Gardner’s 
just deserts retributivism: because of the atonement, no matter what 
wrongs we commit (with limited exceptions), we will not personally 
have to suffer the penalty or pay the price for our sins if we properly 
repent.61
It is another facet of LDS doctrine that in addition to being 
tested we are here to learn.62 And we believe that what we learn here 
will accompany us in the world to come and will determine our place 
in that world.63 Consequently, LDS doctrine teaches that there is no 
division of nor difference between spiritual teachings and laws and 
those that are temporal.64 Anything that may appear to be temporal 
must have a spiritual basis.65 Thus, what the Lord provides for us 
here must inevitably lead us to the truth of his gospel, and ultimately 
back to him. At the very least, the Lord’s teachings will not interfere 
with our ability to achieve exaltation. Because of its tendency to deny 
the possibility of an atonement, just deserts retributivism, as 
described by Professor Gardner, cannot claim the support from LDS 
doctrine that he purports to have found. There are several steps to 
reaching this conclusion, but they are not complicated and are set 
forth below. 
 61. LDS scripture asserts that denying “the Holy Ghost when it once has had place in 
you” is an unpardonable sin, and that murdering “against the light and knowledge of God” is 
placed in the same context, though not explicitly labeled “unpardonable.” See Alma 39:5–6 
(Book of Mormon). 
 62. See, e.g., 2 Nephi 2:14 (Book of Mormon) (“And now my sons, I speak unto you 
these things for your profit and learning . . . .”), 4:15 (“For my soul delighteth in the 
scriptures, and my heart pondereth them, and writeth them for the learning and the profit of 
my children.”). 
 63. See Doctrine & Covenants 130:18 (“Whatever principal of intelligence we attain 
unto in this life, it will rise with us in the resurrection.”). 
 64. The Lord teaches this when he says: 
Wherefore, verily I say unto you that all things unto me are spiritual, and not at any 
time have I given unto you a law which was temporal; neither any man, nor the 
children of men; neither Adam your father, whom I created. Behold, I gave unto 
him that he should be an agent unto himself; and I gave unto him commandment, 
but no temporal commandment gave I unto him, for my commandments are 
spiritual; they are not natural nor temporal, neither carnal nor sensual. 
Doctrine & Covenants 29:34–35. 
 65. Consider, for example, the LDS word of wisdom, which gives temporal rules 
regarding substances that should and should not be consumed. See Doctrine & Covenants 89. 
Yet, the Church teaches that even these apparently temporal commandments with clear 
temporal benefits “are for our spiritual good.” See GOSPEL PRINCIPLES, supra note 43, at 194–
95. 
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The first step is to remember that just deserts retributivism 
requires a just system of law to punish an offender for that 
individual’s crimes—the specific offender must pay for his or her 
offense.66 It is not simply that the broken law must be satisfied, but 
that a just system will only permit satisfaction by the one who broke 
the law. The offender has a fundamental and personal right to be 
punished because of the exercise of free will that resulted in the 
offense.67 To deny that punishment, no matter the benevolent or 
merciful reasons that may seem to exist to do so, is to deny the 
offender’s personhood. The next step is to remember that all earthly 
aspects are a type of those spiritual.68 What lessons can be gleaned 
from retributivist theories of punishment? The primary lesson is that 
each offender must satisfy the demands of justice for his or her own 
offenses. The spiritual corollary would be that if all of us personally 
must suffer the punishment for our crimes then we must do so for 
our sins as well. It is not difficult to see what follows. If we must 
each pay the price of our own sins, then the Savior could not have 
done it for us; it would not have been possible for him to do so. Any 
atonement will have been of null effect, so why look to it and to the 
Lord for our salvation? The inevitable lesson would be that salvation 
is impossible. 
Because we are not perfect and our hands are not clean, it is not 
possible for any of us to pay the price for our own sins. If we do not 
repent and avail ourselves of the Savior’s atonement, we cannot 
become exalted because a metaphorical price for those transgressions 
must be paid, but our own unclean hands cannot pay it. That is what 
the doctrines of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints teach 
regarding the need for a Savior and for his infinite atonement.69
Just deserts retributivism demands that people must be punished 
for their crimes to satisfy justice. In the end, because just deserts 
retributivism is fundamentally inconsistent with the doctrine of the 
atonement and its primacy in the plan of salvation, the notion that 
 66. See Gardner, supra note 2, at 862–70. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See Doctrine & Covenants 29:34–35, in which the Lord reveals that he has never 
given us temporal laws and that all things are spiritual unto him. In explaining the performance 
of the ordinances of the gospel for the dead, the Lord explains in an aside that “that which is 
earthly conform[s] to that which is heavenly.” Doctrine & Covenants 128:13–14. 
 69. See GOSPEL PRINCIPLES, supra note 43, at 73. 
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punishment is required for the sake of punishment alone cannot be 
demanded, and may not even be permitted, by LDS philosophy.70
IV. CONCLUSION 
In his essay purporting to examine the criminal sanction through 
LDS thought, Professor Gardner does not give more than a passing 
mention to the doctrine of the atonement, let alone explain how the 
just deserts retributivism model for punishment could be reconciled 
with it. This omission is quite glaring in an essay that has as its goal 
the analysis of the criminal sanction from a LDS perspective. Given 
the obvious parallels between laws and commandments, crime and 
sin, punishment and consequences, and rehabilitation and 
redemption, Professor Gardner’s failure to address the atonement, to 
explain or explain away its effect on LDS thought regarding secular 
justice given its preeminence in divine justice, leaves his proof of 



















 70. The commandments, teachings, and counsel provided by LDS doctrine must teach 
spiritual principles consistent with the plan of salvation. To the extent that retributivist ideals 
are inconsistent with those principles and would tend to teach the futility of repentance, and 
even of the atonement of itself, just deserts retributivism would be antithetical to LDS 
doctrine. 
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